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Abstract 
Nonprofit workers earn less on average than for-profit workers. Existing empirical work leaves open the 
question of whether this is driven by a willingness to work for less (the “labor donation hypothesis”). 
Wage gaps have consistently been found to be present in some industries and absent in others. In this 
paper, I consider when we should expect labor donations to nonprofits to generate wage gaps and, in 
doing so, offer an explanation for the previous inconsistent results. I highlight the importance of 
nonprofits’ labor demand. Specifically, it is only in nonprofit employers’ interest to maintain low wages if 
their labor demand does not exceed the number of workers who are willing to work for less. Otherwise, 
nonprofits must raise wages to attract other workers. This yields the prediction that wage gaps should be 
largest when the nonprofit share of labor within an industry is low. As nonprofit share increases, wages 
should equalize. Using economy-wide Census microdata, I provide evidence consistent with this 
prediction. I use more detailed data from the nursing home industry to better control for market conditions 
and rule out alternative explanations. I find that the quality of work in nonprofit nursing homes is highest 
in localities with low nonprofit share, where wage gaps are largest. This provides evidence that the 
relationship between wage gaps and nonprofit share is driven by “motivated types” sorting into nonprofit 
jobs.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A long literature examines differences in wages across the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. Some 
empirical work finds clear evidence that nonprofit workers earn less. The most prominent 
explanation for this finding is the “labor donation hypothesis,” which suggests that some 
individuals enjoy nonmonetary benefits from working in a nonprofit and as such are willing to 
work for less.1 An alternative explanation is that nonprofits tend to locate in lower-paying 
industries, so composition effects rather than differential preferences of workers may drive the 
observation of a nonprofit wage differential. However, as demonstrated by Leete (2001) even 
after carefully accounting for industry and occupation, a nonprofit wage differential exists in 
some industries but not others – a puzzling result for either of these two prominent explanations. 
 
I offer a potential explanation for the emergence of wage differentials in some industries but not 
others and, in doing so, revisit the mechanism through which these wage differentials arise more 
generally. Building on a point made by Preston (1989), I test the hypothesis that a nonprofit 
wage differential should exist within an industry when the share of labor demanded by nonprofits 
is low relative to for-profits. I start from the assumption that some workers are in fact willing to 
donate their labor. That is, there exist “intrinsically motivated” types – who receive nonmonetary 
benefits from working for a nonprofit – and “extrinsically motivated” types – who, holding wage 
constant, do not differentiate between nonprofit and for-profit jobs. As long as there are enough 
intrinsically motivated workers to meet their labor demands, nonprofits can minimize costs by 
offering a low wage (thereby, only attracting intrinsically motivated applicants.) However, if 
nonprofit labor demand is high relative to for-profit firms, the nonprofit cannot rely on 
intrinsically motivated workers alone to fill their demand and must offer wages comparable to 
that of for-profits in order to attract extrinsically motivated workers.  
 
I test this hypothesis empirically in two stages. In both stages, rather than attempting to make 
comparisons across very different industries, I examine the impact of the nonprofit share of labor 
within industries but across localities. The first stage assesses the relationship between nonprofit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Labor donation theory” or the “donative labor hypothesis” is an idea which has been suggested in 
various forms by a variety of researchers; see, for instance, Weisbrod (1983), Preston (1989), or Leete 
(2006) for a thorough review. 
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share of labor and wage differentials at an economy-wide level using data from the 2000 Public-
Use Microdata 5%-sample of the United States Census. I construct industry/locality-specific 
nonprofit shares of labor and include a full set of industry fixed effects in all specifications. I find 
evidence that low nonprofit share – where I argue that there is a sufficient number of intrinsically 
motivated workers to meet labor demand – is indeed associated with larger negative wage 
differentials; this is almost entirely driven by college-educated workers. However, there are a 
number of alternative explanations for this result that data limitations do not allow me to address.  
 
Thus, in the second stage, I focus my attention only on the nursing home industry, for which I 
have much richer firm-level data on roughly 95% of nursing homes in the United States. Again, 
exploiting variation in nonprofit share across localities, I replicate the result from the economy-
wide data. I then provide evidence that suggests that this result is not driven by: (1) differences in 
the competitive environment faced by nonprofits in low nonprofit share areas, (2) preferential 
state/local government treatment of nonprofits in some areas (which might generate both high 
nonprofit share and the ability to pay higher wages), or (3) lower quality workers in low 
nonprofit share areas. In fact, I find that nonprofit workers in low nonprofit share areas produce 
higher quality output (despite being paid less). This is consistent with the impliciations of a 
simple model I present in section 4; in particular, by maintaining lower wages nonprofits attract 
only workers who are “intriniscially motivated” and who therefore supply higher effort than is 
required of them. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, I review in more detail existing 
research on nonprofit wage differentials. In sections 3 and 4, I discuss the predictions that I test 
empirically, first in a general way (section 3) and then with more precision using a simple model 
(section 4).  In section 5, I conduct the economy-wide analysis and show that nonprofit share of 
labor indeed appears to be an important determinant of the existence of wage differences across 
sectors (primarily for highly educated workers.) In section 6, I use a richer dataset from a 
particular industry to rule out concerns and alternative explanations that cannot be addressed 
using the economy-wide data. Section 7 offers concluding remarks. 
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2. Related literature 
 
The main challenge in determining whether labor donation theory is a reasonable model of 
nonprofit labor is finding the appropriate for-profit workers to compare nonprofit wages against. 
That is, if what appears to be a “nonprofit” wage differential is in fact driven by differences in 
industry composition across the sectors, then all that exists is an industry wage differential. Two 
main strategies have been employed to account for the differences in industry composition across 
the two sectors: (1) comparing workers within a particular industry/occupation and (2) including 
detailed industry and occupation fixed effects in economy-wide data. However, the conclusions 
that result from each of these strategies have been inconsistent. 
 
The earliest assessments of labor donation theory are typically of the first variety, in part because 
the data necessary to (properly) employ the second strategy did not yet exist. For instance, 
Weisbrod (1983) compares public interest lawyers to private lawyers and demonstrates that, 
controlling for observable characteristics, public interest lawyers earn significantly less. 
Moreover, he provides evidence from survey data that suggests that these lawyers actively select 
into the lower-paying field -- public-interest lawyers report being fully aware of the potential 
earnings they have lost and almost uniformly indicate that these losses are “worth it.” Frank 
(1996) provides a similar result. However, using the same data as Weisbrod but with a different 
econometric approach, Goddeeris (1988) finds little evidence of a pay gap between public 
interest and private lawyers. 
 
Preston (1988), in a comparison of nonprofit and for-profit daycare center workers, finds no 
wage differential in non-federally regulated centers (and a positive nonprofit wage differential in 
centers that are regulated.) However, the absence of a (negative) wage differential is perhaps 
unsurprising in this context as more recent research demonstrates that we primarily observe 
differentials amongst highly educated and “white-collar” workers (Leete, 2001), a result which is 
found in this paper as well. Borjas et al. (1983) and Holtmann and Idson (1993) find little 
evidence of a pay gap between wages in nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes. 
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Thus, amongst the papers that attempt to determine whether the implications of labor donation 
theory hold in specific contexts, no conclusion has been reached. It remains unclear as to 
whether these divergent results stem from particular (and not yet well defined) characteristics of 
the industries that have been considered or if this is suggestive that, generally speaking, the 
implications of labor donation theory are not widely applicable. Thus, more recent research has 
examined economy-wide data to determine whether labor donation theory is meaningful at a 
more general level. An early attempt to do so indeed finds a significant nonprofit wage 
differential, but suffers from a lack of quality data (Preston, 1989); namely, Preston uses data 
from the Current Population Survey, which had not yet started asking respondents to identify 
whether they were nonprofit workers.  
 
Ruhm and Borkoski (2003) also use data from the Current Population Survey to examine 
whether differentials exist on an economy-wide level, but are able to specifically identify 
nonprofit workers. They find a small negative wage differential that is not significantly different 
than zero, which they take as evidence that nonprofit wages are determined in competitive 
markets “without explicit labor donations.” However, they employ limited controls for industry 
and occupation differences. Leete (2001) on the other hand, using 1990 Census microdata, 
employs a full range of industry and occupation fixed effects. While she too fails to detect an 
economy-wide wage differential, she does find large and significant wage differentials in 
particular industries. Narcy (2011) examine wages across sectors in France and finds a 
significant negative wage-differential at an economy-wide level. 
 
Although attempts to test the implications of the labor donation hypothesis (by searching for 
wage gaps) have led to inconclusive results, there is accumulating direct evidence of differences 
in workers and willingness to donate labor across sectors. Using data from the National 
Longitudinal Study of Youth, Benz (2005) documents higher levels of job satisfaction amongst 
nonprofit employees. Lanfranchi et al. (2010)  find that nonprofit workers’ “ideal number of 
hours worked” is higher than that of for-profit workers and that they are willing to receive less 
compensation for additional hours worked. Gregg et al. (2011) show that workers who are more 
willing to “donate labor” (as measured by their willingness to engage in unpaid overtime work) 
are indeed more likely to sort into the nonprofit sector. Serra et al. (2011) obtain survey- and 
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experimental-based proxies of prosocial motivations and find that these measures are predictive 
of health professionals’ selection into the nonprofit sector. 
 
Thus, there appears to be some evidence of workers donating their labor, though the 
circumstances under which this leads to wage differentials is unclear. The only potential 
consensus to draw is that the existence and magnitude of nonprofit wage differentials depends 
heavily on the particular industry and/or occupation in question. This is demonstrated most 
clearly by Leete (2001). Yet, it remains unclear why we would observe a wage differential in 
some industries but not in others and also what factors are important in determining which 
industries are impacted. 
 
3. General hypotheses & contribution to the literature  
 
With this literature in mind, I reconsider the labor donation hypothesis focusing more 
specifically on the circumstances under which we should expect nonprofit firms to offer lower 
wages. In doing so, I hope to provide a better understanding of why nonprofit wage differentials 
are observed in some cases but not others, particularly given recent direect evidence that  
nonprofit workers are willing to donate thier labor. Broadly speaking, the claims I make are the 
following:   
 
1.  A wage differential is observed for industries with low share of labor relative to the 
for-profit sector.  
2.  For industries with large nonprofit share of labor, the difference between for-profit 
and nonprofit wages approaches zero.  
 
The intuition behind these claims (which is described with greater precision in a simple model in 
the next section) begins with the assumption that there are in fact some workers who are willing 
to donate their labor to a nonprofit firm. (Throughout, I refer to this set of workers as 
“intrinsically motivated.”) However, the presence of intrinsically motivated workers alone does 
not guarantee that we would observe wage differentials. Specifically, it must be in nonprofit 
firms’ interest to maintain wages below the market wage. Of course, if workers are willing to 
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accept lower wages, then offering the lowest wage possible minimizes costs. (Additionally, if 
nonprofit firms have a preference for intrinsically motivated workers, then they can guarantee 
that only these workers will apply by setting a wage lower than the for-profit wage.) 
 
However, this is only possible if the total demand for labor in the nonprofit sector exceeds the 
number of intrinsically motivated workers. Otherwise, the nonprofit firm is forced to attract 
extrinsically motivated workers; thus, the nonprofit firm must offer the for-profit wage and, 
because motivation is not observable, it must pay this wage to all workers (including those who 
are willing to work for less). As a result, whether a nonprofit wage differential is observed or not 
in an industry depends crucially on whether the nonprofit share of labor in that industry exceeds 
the proportion of intrinsically motivated workers. 
 
3.1 Interpreting “instrinsic motivation” 
 
All that is required for this argument is that the “intrinsically motivated” worker receives some 
form of nonmonetary benefit from working at a nonprofit firm. The previous literature on labor 
donation theory offers a number of reasons why this might be true. Workers may receive “warm 
glow” or “moral satisfaction” from contributing to the production of a public good (Preston 
(1989), Frank (1996)). Rose-Ackerman (1996) suggests that committed workers may be easier to 
attract because “the lack of equity holders is a signal to employees that their selflessness is not 
enriching someone else.” Hansmann (1980) proposes a slightly different motivation: even if 
nonprofits produce the same type of goods as comparable for-profits, nonprofits still differ in that 
they tend to offer higher quality products than would otherwise be profit-maximizing. This is 
often true, for instance, in healthcare industries. Thus, workers who are motivated to do “good 
work” may be willing to sacrifice wages. Still other motivations are possible: some may prefer 
the work environment offered by nonprofits; alternatively, individuals may be motivated to work 
at a nonprofit to signal to themselves or others that they are the type of person that would do so 
(Bénabou & Tirole, 2006).   
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4. Model 
 
In this section, I offer a simple model to add precision and more carefully consider the argument 
made above. The model builds upon a literature on signaling and screening of worker 
motivations (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2007; Heyes, 2005), which suggests that, if some workers are 
intrinsically motivated to work in a particular job, but motivation is not observable, firms might 
use their offered wage as a screening device. By setting a wage lower than the reservation wage 
of extrinsically motivated workers, they are guaranteed to attract only intrinsically motivated 
workers who receive additional nonmonetary utility from working for the firm. Here I simplify 
and adapt the model of Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) to understand the implications of this model 
in the context of nonprofit wage-setting. 
 
4.1 Basic environment 
 
Suppose there are 𝑁 workers who choose between job offers at a nonprofit firm (NP) or a for-
profit firm (FP). Job offers at each firm are defined solely by wage; required effort is identical 
across the two jobs. FP serves as an outside option for workers not willing to work at NP; I 
therefore assume that FP sets as their wage the lowest wage that workers are willing to accept. 
NP chooses a wage to minimize costs. 
 
All workers choose a firm (NP or FP) and effort level to maximize:  
 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑤! − 𝑐(𝑥) 
 
where 𝑤! is the wage in firm 𝑠, and 𝑐(𝑥) is the cost of effort. However, 𝑤! is only received if 𝑥 ≥ 𝑒, where 𝑒 is the required level of effort at either NP or FP. I assume that there are two types 
of workers: 𝐸 (extrinsically motivated) and 𝐼 (intrinsically motivated), where the proportion of 𝐼 
workers is 𝑃! (with 𝑃! ∈ (0,1)). The utility extrinsically motivated workers receive is given by 𝑢!(𝑥) = 𝑤! − 𝑥! regardless of employer. Intrinsically motivated workers, to some extent, derive 
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positive utility from offering effort to the firm. Thus, intrinsically motivated workers' utility 
depends on the firm that they work for:   
 
    • If employed by FP: 𝑢!(𝑥|𝐹𝑃) = 𝑤!" − 𝑥!  
    • If employed by NP: 𝑢!(𝑥|𝑁𝑃) = 𝑤!" − (𝑥 −𝑚)!  
 
Intrinsic motivation is captured by the addition of 𝑚 to the cost of effort function. Under this 
specification, utility is not strictly decreasing in effort and workers have some preferred level of 
effort that is greater than zero. 
 
4.2 Worker Behavior 
 
FP firms offer the minimum acceptable wage (𝑤!" = 𝑒!), so workers never prefer to not work. 
Extriniscally motivated workers choose jobs based solely on wages. Thus, they choose FP so 
long as 𝑤!" > 𝑤!" and supply minimum effort 𝑒 in either job.2 Intrinsically motivated workers 
supply minimal effort 𝑒 in FP but supply effort 𝑚 > 𝑒 in NP. Thus, they choose NP when 𝑤!" ≥ 𝑤!" − 𝑒!. 
 
4.3 Nonprofit firm behavior 
 
The nonprofit firm aims to minimize labor costs while producing the quantity, q, that is 
demanded by the market. That is, the firm solves the cost minimization problem: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛!!"[𝑤!"𝑛!"] such  that  𝑞 = 𝑘𝑛!"𝑒(𝑤) 
 
where 𝑛!" is the number of workers in NP, 𝑘 is the marginal product of a unit of effort, and 𝑒(𝑤) is the average effort provided by NP workers. Average effort 𝑒(𝑤) depends on the type of 
workers that sort into NP based on offered wages: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 We will assume that if 𝑤!" = 𝑤!", extrinsically motivated workers apply for an NP job and return to 
FP if rejected (this is purely for convenience and does not impact the basic message of the argument). 
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𝑒(𝑤) = 0, 𝑤!" < 𝑤!" − 𝑒!𝑚, 𝑤!" ∈ [𝑤!" − 𝑒!,𝑤!"]𝑃!𝑚 + (1− 𝑃!)𝑒, 𝑤!" ≥ 𝑤!"  
 
Thus, NP will never set 𝑤!" < (𝑤!" − 𝑒!) or 𝑤!" > 𝑤!". Because 𝑒 < 𝑚, average effort is 
highest when 𝑤!" ∈ [𝑤!" − 𝑒!,𝑤!"). However, the NP firm can only produce 𝑞 and set a wage 
in this region if there are enough intrinsically motivated workers to do so; that is: 𝑛!"/𝑁 ≤ 𝑃!. If 
the necessary share of nonprofit labor exceeds the proportion of intrinsically motivated workers 
– 𝑛!"/𝑁 > 𝑃! – the firm is forced to offer 𝑤!" ≥ 𝑤!" to attract extrinsically motivated workers 
and produce 𝑞. 
 
4.4 Resulting predictions 
 
NP minimizes costs by choosing 𝑤!" = 𝑤!" − 𝑒! when 𝑛!"/𝑁 < 𝑃! and 𝑤!" = 𝑤!" otherwise. 
With 𝑤!" = 𝑤!" − 𝑒! , only intrinsically motivated types sort into the nonprofit sector. 
Otherwise, both types may do so. This yields two predictions:  
1. Thus, a nonprofit wage differential emerges only when nonprofit labor share is relatively 
low and does not exceed the proportion of intrinsically motivated workers in society. As 
nonprofit share increases, the gap between wages across the two sectors shrinks. 
2. Average effort is higher in nonprofits when nonprofit share is low. As nonprofit share 
increases, the gap between effort across the two sectors shrinks. 
For the most part, the empirical analysis will address the first prediction. However, in Section 6 
(where I have sufficiently detailed data to assess the quality of workers’ output) I provide 
evidence in favor of the second prediction. 
 
5. Empirical approach & hypotheses 
 
With these predictions, we should observe nonprofit wage differentials in industries with 
relatively low labor shares (relative to for-profits in the same industry). Though she does not 
discuss this relationship, Leete’s (2001) results are consistent with this claim. Figure 1 plots 
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nonprofit share for each industry included in her analysis against her estimated wage 
differentials. 
 
However, because the industries being compared here are very different, we should be hesitant to 
draw inferences from this simple relationship; the relationship could stem from other 
characteristics of industries that lead them to simultaneously display low nonprofit shares and 
larger wage differentials. This problem is of course part of the reason that there is little 
consensus in the existing literature that examines very specific contexts; namely, it is unclear 
whether to interpret the absence of a wage differential in some contexts as evidence against labor 
donation theory generally speaking or as simply stemming from some specific characteristics of 
that particular context. 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between estimated wage differential and nonprofit share from Leete 
(2001) -- Each point represents a particular industry 
 
To avoid this problem, I will instead compare wage differentials within industries but across 
localities. This will be accomplished by including a full range of industry fixed effects. For 
instance, rather than comparing the wage differential amongst radio workers (an industry with 
low nonprofit labor share) to that of hospital workers (an industry with very high nonprofit labor 
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share), I compare the wage differential of radio workers in a locality with low radio-worker 
nonprofit share to the differential amongst radio workers in a different locality with high 
nonprofit labor share. If the argument above is correct, then, for a particular industry, nonprofit 
wage differentials should be largest amongst localities with low nonprofit share and wages 
should be roughly equal in localities with high nonprofit shares.3  
 
To summarize then, the broad explanation I offer for variance in differentials across industries is 
that, in industries with low nonprofit share, there are enough intrinsically motivated workers in 
society (and within the particular industry in question) such that the nonprofit sector can rely 
only on those workers and therefore does not need to match the for-profit wage in an attempt to 
attract extrinsically motivated workers. However, for industries with large nonprofit shares (like 
hospitals) all of the intrinsically motivated workers have already been exploited and firms must 
raise wages to attract other workers. Thus, wage differentials are only observed in industries with 
low nonprofit shares. The empirical hypotheses I will test to assess this claim are that, within 
industries, wage differentials will exist in localities with low industry/locality-specific nonprofit 
share, but as nonprofit share increases, the differential will be eliminated. 
 
6. Economy-wide analysis 
 
6.1 Data and estimation approach 
 
I first test the claim that nonprofit wage differentials depend on the nonprofit share of labor using 
microdata from the 5%-sample of the 2000 Census. Specifically, I construct nonprofit shares by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Note that this argument assumes some limitations on mobility. Namely, we might think that if moving is 
costless, intrinsically motivated workers would locate to areas where the nonprofit wage differential has 
been eliminated where they can obtain both higher pay and the nonmonetary benefits of working for a 
nonprofit. However, keep in mind that in the explanation provided above, when nonprofit share is low 
and a wage differential exists, intrinsically motivated workers are only competing with other intrinsically 
motivated to obtain a particular position. This is no longer true when wages are equal across sectors, in 
which case all workers are competing for the nonprofit job. This barrier to entry to nonprofit jobs in areas 
with high nonprofit shares combined with some mobility cost makes it reasonable to assume that, to some 
degree (and at least in the short-run), tied to their current location. Moreover, insofar as mobility does 
pose a threat to this empirical strategy, it would only lead to an underestimate of the true effects. 
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industry at the Super-PUMA level.4 That is, for a particular industry 𝑖 and Super-PUMA 𝑠, 
nonprofit share (NPS) is constructed as the sum of observed nonprofit workers divided by the 
sum of all observed workers in the industry/locality:  
 𝑁𝑃𝑆!" = (total  nonprofit  employment)!"(total  nonprofit  employment)!" + (total  for− profit  employment)!" 
 
Because we are exclusively interested in labor markets where workers can sort into either 
nonprofit or for-profit jobs, I omit industry-locality groupings with nonprofit share equal to 0 or 
1 – that is, labor markets totally dominated by either nonprofits or for-profits. Moreover, to avoid 
unreliable NPS measures I omit industry-locality groupings with less than 100 total workers, 
though results are similar without this restriction. 
 
Restricting attention to full-time workers in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, the main 
estimating equation is given by:  
 𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠) = 𝛼 + 𝛽!nonprofit+ 𝛽!(nonprofit  ×  NPS)+ 𝛽!NPS+ [controls/FEs] 
 
where “nonprofit” is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the worker works for a nonprofit firm and 
“nonprofit X NPS” is the interaction of nonprofit employment and industry-locality specific 
nonprofit share. I include either state or Super-PUMA fixed effects, as well as industry and 
occupation fixed effects. These fixed effects control for any industry-specific features and 
therefore ensure that we are comparing wage differentials within particular industries but across 
localities. I also include a variety of controls such as education, potential experience (calculated 
as age - years of education - 6), gender, marital status, and race. I attempt to better capture true 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A PUMA, or Public Use Microdata Area, is a geographic grouping with a population of at least 100,000 
constructed by the Census Bureau to ensure confidentiality of respondents. A Super-PUMA is a grouping 
of several PUMAs and has a total population of at least 400,000; Super-PUMAs are therefore relatively 
uniform in population, which is one reason that I use Super-PUMAs to estimate nonprofit share rather 
than, for instance, counties or metropolitan areas where there is great variance in population across 
localities. I use Super-PUMAs rather than PUMAs to increase the precision of the constructed nonprofit 
share measure. PUMAs are arguably better representations of “localities” but, being much smaller, counts 
of workers in particular industries would be a much noisier representation of the actual number of 
workers per industry in the area. This trade-off is not faced in the industry-specific analysis of the next 
section. 
	   13 
(but unobserved) workforce experience by interacting gender, marital status, and “potential 
experience” to allow for, for instance, women’s time spent out of the workforce for maternity.   
Throughout, standard errors are clustered at the Super-PUMA level.  
 
The nonprofit wage differential is given by:  
 𝐸[𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)|nonprofit = 1,𝑋]− 𝐸[𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)|nonprofit = 0,𝑋] = 𝛽! + 𝛽!NPS 
  
If the argument above is correct, then we should observe a large negative nonprofit wage 
differential when NPS is low. However, this differential should become less negative as NPS 
increases. Thus, we would expect to find that 𝛽! < 0 and 𝛽! > 0. 
 
6.2 Results 
 
TABLE 1: Baseline specifications  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Log(Wage) Log(Wage) 
   
Nonprofit -0.0357*** -0.0273*** 
 (0.00471) (0.00408) 
Nonprofit X NP share 0.136*** 0.126*** 
 (0.0110) (0.00955) 
NP share -0.0573** -0.0668*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0197) 
Constant 1.954*** 2.768*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0164) 
   
State FEs X  
Super-PUMA FEs  X 
   
Observations 899,124 899,124 
R-squared 0.434 0.450 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at super-PUMA level) in parentheses. Both 
specifications include additional controls as noted in the text. 
 
 
Table 1 presents the estimation of the main specification, with and without Super-PUMA fixed 
effects. Negative nonprofit wage differentials exist at low nonprofit shares (as can be seen from 
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the significant and negative “nonprofit” coefficient), but this wage differential decreases as 
nonprofit share increases (as can be seen from the significant and positive “nonprofit X NPS” 
coefficient.)  
 
However, turning to Table 2 which splits the sample into “high education” and “low education” 
groups – with “high education” defined as individuals holding a bachelor’s degree or higher – we 
see that this result is primarily driven by highly educated individuals. Indeed, while we observe 
the hypothesized signs on the coefficients in Table 1 (which includes high and low education 
groups), when we restrict our attention to highly educated individuals (columns 3 and 4 of Table 
2) we observe both the hypothesized signs and much larger magnitudes.  
 
 
TABLE 2: Baseline specifications split by education group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log(Wage) Log(Wage) Log(Wage) Log(Wage) 
     
Nonprofit -0.00303 -9.20e-05 -0.0959*** -0.0830*** 
 (0.00475) (0.00449) (0.00710) (0.00639) 
Nonprofit X NP share 0.0736*** 0.0764*** 0.209*** 0.192*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0152) (0.0136) 
NP share -0.0668*** -0.0395** -0.0792** -0.116*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0172) (0.0333) (0.0316) 
Constant 1.840*** 2.694*** 2.435*** 3.081*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0235) (0.0390) (0.0317) 
     
Educ. group Low Low High High 
State FEs X  X  
Super-PUMA FEs  X  X 
     
Observations 564,020 564,020 335,104 335,104 
R-squared 0.340 0.363 0.320 0.335 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at super-PUMA level) in parentheses. All specifications include 
additional controls as noted in the text. 
 
 
Given the model and intuition behind the testable predictions, the fact that this effect is largely 
restricted to highly educated individuals is not surprising. The argument made in previous 
sections depends heavily on the idea that workers are tied to a particular industry and sort to for-
profits or nonprofits within that industry. This assumption is more true of highly educated – and 
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therefore more specialized – individuals.  For this reason, I focus on highly educated workers for 
the remainder of the paper. 
 
To provide a clearer sense of the impact of within-industry variance in nonprofit share, Table 3 
repeats the estimation of the baseline specification (with super-PUMA FEs and high education 
workers only), but now restricting the sample to one industry at a time. I focus on a set of 
industries which are prominent in the nonprofit sector and/or are often discussed in the previous 
literature on nonprofit wage differentials.  
 
TABLE 3: Baseline specifications split by industry 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Industry: Clinics Hospitals Research/Dev. 
    
Nonprofit -0.0535* 0.0272 -0.234*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0262) (0.0486) 
Nonprofit X NPS 0.236 -0.00275 0.413*** 
 (0.207) (0.0567) (0.145) 
Constant 3.104*** 2.958*** 3.533*** 
 (0.156) (0.0916) (0.147) 
    
Super-PUMA FEs X X X 
    
Observations 13,200 51,024 5,286 
R-squared 0.454 0.286 0.367 
    
 (4) (5) (6) 
Industry: Nursing homes Media Legal services 
    
Nonprofit -0.0700* -0.227*** -0.485*** 
 (0.0400) (0.0330) (0.151) 
Nonprofit X NPS 0.123 0.584* 0.457 
 (0.171) (0.328) (2.373) 
Constant 3.524*** 3.164*** 3.555*** 
 (0.147) (0.119) (0.218) 
    
Super-PUMA FEs X X X 
    
Observations 6,562 13,141 1,454 
R-squared 0.426 0.330 0.322 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at super-PUMA level) in parentheses. Both 
specifications include additional controls as noted in the text. 
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We see that, with the exception of the hospital industry, within each of these industries the 
pattern is generally consistent with that of the main results – the nonprofit wage differential is 
initially negative, but shrinks as nonprofit share increases. Moreover, it is not surprising that 
hospitals serve as the exception here given that, unlike the other industries, nonprofit share is 
almost always relatively high within a locality. Thus, the only observations of hospitals in the 
dataset are observations wherein, according to my argument, all available intrinsically motivated 
workers have been hired.  
 
Finally, while the preceding results document the predicted directional impact of nonprofit share 
on wages, we should expect to see the wage differential decreasing with nonprofit share within 
some range but ultimately flattening out as wages equalize. To assess this, I modify the baseline 
specification to allow for a cubic relationship between nonprofit share and wages: 
 𝑙𝑛 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠= 𝛼 + 𝛽!nonprofit + 𝛽! nonprofit  ×  NPS + 𝛽!NPS + 𝛽! nonprofit  ×  NPS! + 𝛽!NPS!+ 𝛽! nonprofit  ×  NPS! + 𝛽!NPS! + [controls/FEs] 
 
The resulting wage differential (as a function of nonprofit share) is plotted in Figure 2, with 
nonprofit share along the x-axis and wage differential on the y-axis. With low nonprofit share, 
highly educated nonprofit workers earn roughly 12% less than their for-profit counterparts. 
However, this differential shrinks as nonprofit share increases until nonprofit share reaches a 
certain point, after which there is essentially no difference in wages across the two sectors. 
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Figure 2: Wage differential as a function of nonprofit share 
(Shaded area represents 95% confidence interval) 
 
 
7. Nursing home industry analysis 
 
The previous section demonstrates at an economy-wide level that the existence of a nonprofit 
wage differential depends heavily on the nonprofit share of labor. In particular, there exist 
significant negative wage differentials within industries (amongst highly educated workers) in 
localities with relatively low nonprofit share. These differentials are diminished in localities with 
higher nonprofit shares. These results are in line with what we would expect to find based on the 
explanation put forth in the previous section: nonprofit wage differentials exist as long as there 
are enough “intrinsically motivated” workers available to satisfy labor demand, after which firms 
must raise wages to draw in additional workers.  
 
However, based on limitations of the Census data, there are several alternative explanations for 
the empirical results that have not been accounted for. Are nonprofit workers in low-nonprofit 
share areas simply lower quality, and their wages reflect this? Are the results driven by 
differences in the competitve environment faced by low-NPS versus high-NPS nonprofits? 
Alternatively, the results might be driven by differences in government attitudes towards 
nonprofits across localities.  
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To address these concerns, I turn to a similar but more detailed analysis of a particular industry – 
namely, the nursing home industry – with much richer data available to better account for these 
issues. I employ a firm-level dataset from the United States Department of Health & Human 
Services that contains information about every nursing home in the country that is registered 
with Meidcare or Medicaid, thereby capturing 95% of nursing homes.5 In the data, for each 
nursing home I observe: nonprofit/for-profit status, location (street address), number of residents, 
number of beds, total labor hours per resident, and a set of quality measures.  
 
In addition to the richness of the data, focusing on the nursing home industry is interesting in its 
own right as there have been a number of papers specifically examining wage differences across 
nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes (e.g., Borjas et al. (1983), Holtmann and Idson (1993)). 
The general consensus from the literature is that, after accounting for the quality of workers, 
there is little difference between for-profit and nonprofit nursing home pay. Thus, nursing homes 
provide a strong test for my central claim. 
 
7.1 Data 
 
In the economy-wide analysis, a rough estimate of nonprofit share was constructed from the 
number of nonprofit workers per industry and locality reported in the Census data, which is why 
the relatively large Super-PUMA was used as the main geographic unit. Given exact numbers of 
labor hours used for (almost) the entire universe of nursing homes, here I can construct precise 
nonprofit shares within more appropriate geographic groupings. In particular, the geographic 
concept used in this section is the “commuting zone,” as defined and constructed by Tolbert et al. 
(1996). Commuting zones are clusters of counties organized around particular labor markets 
based on information from previous Censuses about individuals’ place of residence and place of 
work. Commuting zones can loosely be thought of as being similar to metropolitan areas, but – 
unlike the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) – they cover the entire country. Thus, in this 
section I construct the nonprofit share within a particular commuting zone (CZ) as: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The data is gathered for the department’s Nursing Home Compare website – which is designed to help 
individuals find and becomes informed about nursing homes in their area. The raw data used for this 
website is freely available at http://data.medicare.gov.  
	   19 
 𝑁𝑃𝑆!" = (𝑠𝑢𝑚  𝑜𝑓  𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠  𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠  𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡  𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠  𝑖𝑛  𝐶𝑍)(𝑠𝑢𝑚  𝑜𝑓  𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟  ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠  𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠  𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠  𝑖𝑛  𝐶𝑍)  
 
The quality measures included in the data are constructed by the Department of Health & Human 
Services and are based on safety inspections and a set of ten resident health measures (e.g., 
“Percent of residents with pressure sores.”), which therefore can be interpreted as a measure of 
the quality of output of employees of the nursing home.6 
 
The nursing home data does not include any information about wages. I pair the nursing home 
data, which I use to construct locality-specific information such as nonprofit share, with 
microdata from the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS asks many of the same 
questions as the Census data used in the economy-wide analysis, but only provides a 1%-sample 
of the United States population. The size of the sample is less critical here though, as I am not 
relying on this data to construct estimates of nonprofit shares (as was the case in the previous 
section.)   
 
7.2 Empirical approach & baseline results 
 
The general empirical strategy is the same here as in the previous section. I restrict my sample, 
drawn from the ACS data, to individuals who work in the nursing home industry and, as a 
baseline specification, estimate: 
 𝑙𝑛 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽!nonprofit+ 𝛽!(nonprofit  ×  NPS)+ [controls/FEs] 
 
I include the same individual-level controls as before (race, education, the interactions of 
expereince, gender, and marital status), commuting-zone fixed effects (which capture the main 
effect of NPS), and occupation fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting-
zone level.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Detailed descriptions of the construction of these quality ratings can be found at 
http://www.cms.gov/CertificationandComplianc/13_FSQRS.asp 
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The results of this baseline specification – essentially replicating the approach from the previous 
section but with a single industry and a better NPS measure – are reported in Column 1 of Table 
4.  Again, as before, we find a large and significant negative wage differential when nonprofit 
share is low (as indicated by the “nonprofit” coefficent) that disappears as nonprofit share 
increases (as indicated by the postive & significant “nonprofit X NPS” coefficient.) 
 
 
TABLE 4: Wage differentials in the nursing home industry  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
     
Nonprofit -0.173*** -0.528*** -0.173*** -0.352** 
 (0.0533) (0.190) (0.0533) (0.163) 
Nonprofit X NPS 0.386*** 0.542*** 0.389*** 0.996* 
 (0.141) (0.194) (0.144) (0.558) 
Nonprofit X (# of residents)  3.43e-07   
  (2.97e-06)   
Nonprofit X (# of for-prof. 
firms) 
 7.46e-05   
  (0.000320)   
Nonprofit X (# of non-prof. 
firms) 
 -0.000610   
  (0.00136)   
Nonprofit X HHI   -0.135  
   (1.131)  
Constant 4.222*** 4.236*** 4.222*** 4.092*** 
 (0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.247) 
     
Observations 2,082 2,064 2,082 2,084 
R-squared 0.506 0.505 0.506 0.503 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at commuting zone level) in parentheses. All specifications 
include additional controls as noted in the text. 
 
7.3 Controlling for market conditions 
 
Aside from eliminating noise from the NPS measure, the estimation presented in column 1 is 
subject to the same concerns as in the economy-wide data. Thus, in the remaining columns of 
Table 4, I attempt to minimize such concerns. In particular, it is possible that the economy-wide 
results are driven by differences in the market conditions that low- and high-NPS nonprofits 
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face. However, because these preceding results include locality fixed effects (Super-PUMA fixed 
effects in the previous section and CZ fixed effects here), “market conditions” can only impact 
the results insofar as they differentially impact the way that nonprofits and for-profits set wages.  
 
With this in mind, in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4, I add controls for local market characteristics 
that were not possible to account for in the economy-wide data and – because it is only the 
differential impact of market conditions on nonprofits’ wage setting that we are concerned about 
– all measures are interacted with whether or not the worker is employed by a nonprofit. In 
particular, in column 2 I control for directly observable measures: number of nursing-home 
residents in the CZ, number of for-profit nursing homes in the CZ, and number of nonprofit 
nursing homes in the CZ. These measures control for the general size of the market but also 
loosely account for the relative market concentrations of nonprofits and for-profits. For instance, 
it is possible for nonprofit share to be high either because there is one large nonprofit nursing 
home or many small nonprofit nursing homes. This difference of course would not be picked up 
by NPS alone, but could impact wage-setting. Similarly, in column 3, these measures are 
summarized into a single constructed variable: the Herfindahl-Hischmann Index for nursing 
homes within the CZ.  In both columns 2 and 3, we see that these market characteristics do not 
significantly differentially impact the wages of nonprofit workers. (They presumably impact 
wages generally but, again, any general effect is captured by the CZ fixed effects.) More 
importantly, we see that, even accounting for these characteristics, the general result from the 
baseline model holds: a significant and negative “nonprofit” coefficient paired with a significant 
and positive “nonprofit X NPS” coefficient. 
 
7.4 Endogeneity of nonprofit share 
 
Alternatively, there is some concern that nonprofit share and the wage differential are 
endogeneous. In particular, if a state or local government provides conditions which reduce costs 
for nonprofits to a greater degree than elsewhere, then nonprofits may have more funds available 
to pay workers. At the same time, a generally more nonprofit-friendly environment is also likely 
to increase nonprofit share. To attempt to address this, I use a two-stage least squares 
instrumental variables approach, taking an instrument for nonprofit share that has been used in 
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previous literature (Grabowski & Hirth, 2003; Sloan et al., 2001). In particular, I instrument for 
NPS using the growth in the elderly population (ages 65 and above) in the first half of the 
decade, from 2001-2006. As Grabowski and Hirth (2003) discuss, for-profit nursing homes face 
lower start-up costs and can more quickly react to demand. Thus, a locality with higher recent 
growth in elderly population is likely to have a lower nonprofit share for reasons unrelated to 
local government’s preferences towards nonprofits. The results of this estimation are displayed 
in column 4 of Table 4, and indeed the main result survives (and is in fact stronger.) 
 
7.5 Quality of nonprofit workers 
 
Finally, an important concern in the economy-wide anaylsis is the possibility that, in localities 
with low nonprofit share, nonprofit workers are less productive and the negative wage 
differential simply reflected this quality differential. The simple model in Section 4 predicts just 
the opposite. In this section, I take advantage of the nursing home quality measures constructed 
by the Department of Health & Human Services and assess the quality of a nursing home’s 
output as a function of their nonprofit status and the nonprofit share in their locality. That is, 
taking a nursing home as the unit of observation, I estimate: 
 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽!nonprofit+ 𝛽!(nonprofit  ×  NPS)+ [controls/FEs] 
 
where, as in previous regressions, I include commuting zone fixed effects and cluster standard 
errors at the commuting zone level. In one specification, I include firm-level controls: the 
nursing home’s share of their market, registered nurse (RN) labor hours per resident, licensed 
practical nurse (LPN) labor hours per resident, other staff hours per resident, total residents, and 
ratio of total residents to total beds.  
 
If the previous results were in fact driven by less productive workers in low-NPS areas, we 
would expect to see a similar pattern amongst these coefficients as we have observed in previous 
results: the “nonprofit” coefficient would be significantly negative while “nonprofit X NPS” 
would be significantly positive. However, as can be seen in Table 5, we observe just the 
opposite; quality at nonprofits is significantly higher quality when nonprofit share is low and 
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decreases amongst nonprofits in higher nonprofit share areas. That is, it is precisely the areas 
where nonprofit nursing home pay is lowest that nonprofit quality is highest, and as nonprofit 
share increases (and nonprofit pay increases) the quality of output at nonprofits moves closer to 
that of for-profits. This is consistent with a model – such as the motivation-screening model 
presented here – wherein lower wages in nonprofits draw in workers who are willing to put forth 
greater effort than is required of them. 
 
TABLE 5: Quality differentials as a function of nonprofit share 
 (1) (2) 
   
Nonprofit 0.712*** 0.386*** 
 (0.0820) (0.0819) 
Nonprofit X NPS -0.797*** -0.398* 
 (0.236) (0.221) 
Firm market share  -1.413 
  (0.915) 
RN Hours/resident  0.231*** 
  (0.0289) 
LPN Hours/resident  -0.116*** 
  (0.0414) 
CNA Hours/resident  0.162*** 
  (0.0315) 
Residents  -0.004*** 
  (0.001) 
Fraction of beds occupied  1.916*** 
  (0.114) 
Constant 2.664*** 1.147*** 
 (0.0120) (0.138) 
   
Additional firm-level controls  X 
   
Observations 13,393 13,089 
R-squared 0.117 0.182 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors (clustered at commuting zone level) in parentheses.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I provide one possible explanation for the existence of nonprofit wage differentials 
in some industries but not others (as documented most systematically by Leete (2001), but also 
by a long line of papers examining wage differentials within particular industries) and, in doing 
so, attempt to contribute to a more general discussion of whether such wage differentials are 
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driven by “labor donations” or industrial composition of the sectors. Specifically, I build on a 
point made by Preston in 1989; even when some workers are willing to donate their labor, in 
order for a wage differential to exist, it must be in firms’ interests to maintain low wages. Once 
the number of workers demanded by nonprofits exceeds the number of “intrinsically motivated” 
workers, firms must raise their wages. This, then yields the prediction that the existence of a 
nonprofit wage differential within a particular industry depends on how much labor nonprofits 
demand relative to for-profits, with wage differentials existing only in industries with relative 
low nonprofit shares of labor.  
 
I provide empirical evidence consistent with this suggestion. To avoid making comparisons 
across industries which are very different, I instead examine nonprofit wage differentials as a 
function of nonprofit share within industries but across localities, first through a detailed set of 
industry fixed-effects in an economy-wide analysis and by examining one industry in more 
detail. Throughout, it is indeed the case that wage differentials exist when nonprofit share is low 
– and firms are able to draw in intrinsically motivated workers – that then disappear as nonprofit 
share increase – with firms required to draw in extrinsically motivated workers. Using a detailed 
firm-level dataset that encompasses 95% of nursing homes within the United States, I provide 
evidence that suggests that these results are not driven by differences in competitive 
environments or endogeneity stemming from differential government treatment of nonprofits 
across localities. I also show that in the nursing home industry, the quality of nonprofit work is 
highest when nonprofit share is low and decreases as nonprofit share increases. This result is 
striking as it demonstrates that the nonprofit workers being paid the least (relative to their for-
profit counterparts) are also the workers who are producing the highest quality work. 
 
Thus, empirically, there is clear evidence that the existence of nonprofit wage differentials 
depends on nonprofit share. Moreover, these results are consistent with the explanation I offer 
for differences in wage differentials across industries. However, I of course do not claim this 
explanation to be the sole factor driving differences in wage determination across industries. For 
instance, an important factor which has not been discussed here is the fact that, in some 
industries, the output of nonprofit and for-profit firms within an industry does not differ greatly. 
As I noted above, this is not necessary for the explanation I have provided; instead, the argument 
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I have made here only requires that workers have some reason to prefer working at a nonprofit. 
Nonetheless, I do not mean minimize the importance of such factors. Instead, the goal of this 
paper is to point out that, holding other factors constant, nonprofit share of labor is one important 
factor in determining whether a wage differential does or does not exist. 
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